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1	  Introduction	  	  From	  1998	  to	  2006,	  average	  home	  prices	  in	  OECD	  countries	  increased	  dramatically	  by	  70%.	  	  This	  paper	  will	  examine	  housing	  booms	  and	  busts	  on	  a	  global	  scale;	  looking	  at	  home	  prices	  in	  15	  different	  developed	  countries.	  (See	  Appendix	  1)	  Through	  empirical	  analysis	  and	  a	  review	  of	  current	  literature,	  this	  paper	  will	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  roots	  of	  recent	  housing	  booms,	  and	  an	  overview	  of	  possible	  policy	  responses.	  In	  September	  2007,	  Goldman	  Sachs	  released	  a	  report	  entitled	  “Rising	  Risks	  to	  the	  Global	  Housing	  Market.”	  	  This	  report	  pointed	  to	  the	  rising	  correlation	  of	  home	  prices	  among	  most	  of	  the	  OECD	  countries.	  	  According	  to	  their	  housing	  data,	  correlation	  between	  home	  prices	  in	  OECD	  countries	  has	  increased	  from	  50%	  in	  the	  1970s	  to	  90%	  between	  1998-­‐2006.	  This	  paper	  was	  early	  in	  detecting	  that	  many	  global	  housing	  markets	  were	  straying	  from	  fundamentals.	  There	  is	  extensive	  literature	  on	  the	  housing	  bubble	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  subsequent	  mortgage	  crisis.	  	  	  Additionally,	  Ireland	  and	  Spain	  experienced	  housing	  bubbles	  during	  the	  same	  years	  as	  the	  U.S.	  	  Therefore,	  a	  cross-­‐country	  approach	  might	  give	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  recent	  activity	  in	  housing	  markets.	  	  
1a	  Trends	  in	  Home	  Prices	  The	  U.S.,	  Spain,	  Ireland,	  and	  Denmark	  all	  experienced	  similar	  patterns	  in	  their	  housing	  markets	  as	  seen	  in	  Figure	  1.1.	  	  	  Between	  2000	  and	  2006,	  real	  house	  prices	  increased	  annually	  by	  an	  average	  of	  11%	  in	  Spain,	  5.4%	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  8%	  in	  Ireland,	  and	  8%	  in	  Denmark.	  	  From	  2007	  to	  2011,	  real	  house	  prices	  decreased	  annually	  by	  an	  average	  of	  4.5%	  in	  Spain,	  5%	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  8.7%	  in	  Ireland,	  and	  6.3%	  in	  Denmark.	  	  Most	  economists	  have	  concluded	  that	  these	  countries	  experienced	  national	  housing	  bubbles	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Figure	  1.1	  –	  Real	  Housing	  Prices	  Index	  (Basis	  Year	  =	  2000)	  in	  U.S.,	  Spain,	  Ireland,	  and	  Denmark	  
Source:	  OECD	  In	  comparison,	  home	  prices	  in	  France,	  Canada,	  and	  Australia	  rose	  very	  quickly	  in	  from	  2000-­‐2006,	  and	  have	  not	  fallen.	  (Figure	  1.2)	  	  In	  2011,	  The	  Economist	  determined	  that	  home	  prices	  in	  Australia,	  Canada,	  and	  France	  looked	  more	  overvalued	  than	  home	  prices	  in	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  bubble.	  The	  Economist	  also	  noted	  that	  Australia	  and	  Canada	  both	  have	  higher	  household	  debt	  than	  the	  U.S.	  did	  in	  2007.1	  Since	  interest	  rates	  have	  remained	  low	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis,	  this	  prolonged	  period	  of	  interest	  rates	  may	  be	  propping	  up	  home	  prices	  at	  a	  national	  level
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Finally,	  real	  home	  prices	  in	  Germany	  and	  Japan	  steadily	  decreased	  from	  2000	  to	  2011.	  	  (Seen	  in	  Figure	  1.3)	  	  In	  Germany,	  economists	  believe	  that	  low	  population	  growth	  has	  led	  to	  lower	  prices.	  	  Japan’s	  recent	  housing	  bubble	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  low	  economic	  activity	  most	  likely	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  home	  prices.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.3	  –	  Real	  Housing	  Prices	  Index	  (Basis	  Year	  =	  2000)	  in	  U.S.,	  Japan	  and	  Germany	  
Source:	  OECD	  These	  graphs	  clearly	  show	  three	  different	  patterns	  in	  recent	  housing	  market	  activity.	  	  Most	  economic	  papers	  cite	  declining	  interest	  rates	  and	  financial	  innovation	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  bubble;	  however,	  this	  idea	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  countries	  around	  the	  world.	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reasons.	  	  First,	  housing	  is	  not	  an	  actively	  traded	  market;	  therefore,	  consumers	  might	  be	  unaware	  of	  their	  true	  wealth.	  	  Second,	  since	  wealth	  in	  real	  estate	  might	  is	  usually	  a	  long-­‐term	  investment,	  consumers	  might	  not	  think	  it	  was	  appropriate	  for	  consumption	  in	  the	  present.	  	  	  They	  studied	  these	  effects	  extensively	  over	  the	  period	  1975-­‐1996	  by	  performing	  a	  panel	  regression	  between	  U.S.	  states	  and	  then	  performing	  a	  different	  panel	  regression	  on	  industrialized	  countries.	  	  Surprisingly,	  they	  concluded	  that	  wealth	  effects	  from	  home	  prices	  were	  much	  stronger	  than	  wealth	  effects	  from	  the	  stock	  market.	  	  Between	  2000	  and	  2005,	  the	  value	  of	  residential	  real	  estate	  increased	  by	  $10	  trillion	  in	  the	  U.S.	  	  In	  the	  U.S.	  and	  in	  other	  countries,	  which	  experienced	  housing	  booms,	  the	  rise	  in	  home	  prices	  led	  to	  a	  boom	  in	  consumer	  spending	  and	  economic	  activity.	  	  Since	  much	  of	  this	  “wealth”	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  U.S.,	  Spain,	  and	  Ireland,	  was	  due	  to	  speculation,	  wealth	  effects	  led	  to	  a	  painful	  recession	  when	  the	  housing	  market	  bust.	  	  Unemployment	  skyrocketed	  to	  22%	  in	  Spain	  and	  14%	  in	  Ireland	  by	  2011.	  Housing	  bubbles	  also	  produce	  income	  effects.	  According	  to	  Tobin’s	  “q”	  theory,	  the	  ratio	  between	  home	  prices	  and	  construction	  costs	  predict	  the	  amount	  of	  residential	  investment.	  	  If	  home	  prices	  are	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  building	  a	  home,	  residential	  investment	  will	  continue	  to	  rise.	  	  According	  to	  the	  OECD,	  this	  relationship	  between	  residential	  investment	  and	  home	  prices	  was	  statistically	  significant	  over	  1995-­‐2004.	  (figure	  1.4)	  	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  figure	  below,	  Spain	  and	  Ireland	  had	  a	  much	  higher	  change	  in	  residential	  investment	  and	  change	  in	  Q	  ratio	  in	  comparison	  to	  Japan	  and	  Germany.	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Figure	  1.4	  –	  Housing	  Investment	  and	  Tobin’s	  Q,	  source:	  OECD	  Because	  home	  prices	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  residential	  investment,	  volatility	  in	  the	  housing	  market	  affects	  employment	  in	  industries	  related	  to	  real	  estate	  and	  construction.	  The	  Bureau	  of	  Labor	  Statistics	  estimated	  U.S.	  employment	  effects	  of	  the	  recent	  housing	  bubble.	  	  The	  BLS	  created	  two	  economic	  models,	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  bubble	  began	  in	  either	  1996	  or	  2002.	  	  According	  to	  these	  studies,	  the	  bubble	  contributed	  1.2	  million	  to	  1.7	  million	  jobs	  in	  2005,	  which	  accounted	  for	  .8	  to	  1.2	  percent	  of	  total	  U.S.	  employment.	  	  And	  in	  2008	  there	  were	  1.7	  to	  2.2	  million	  fewer	  residential-­‐construction	  related	  jobs	  than	  there	  would	  have	  been	  if	  there	  had	  not	  been	  a	  bubble.2	  	  In	  Spain,	  employment	  in	  the	  construction	  sector	  was	  50%	  higher	  in	  2007,	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  housing	  bubble,	  than	  in	  2000.	  	  Additionally,	  construction	  employment	  in	  Spain	  declined	  by	  61%	  from	  2007	  to	  2012.3	  	  In	  Ireland,	  employment	  in	  the	  construction	  sector	  was	  60%	  lower	  in	  2012	  than	  in	  2006,	  whereas	  employment	  in	  the	  Irish	  industrial	  sector	  was	  20%	  lower.4	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Byun,	  Kathryn	  J.	  "The	  U.S.	  housing	  bubble	  and	  bust:	  Impacts	  on	  employment."	  Monthly	  Labor	  Review	  (2010).	  Bureau	  of	  Labor	  Statistics.	  	  3	  Instituto	  Nacional	  de	  Estadística	  de	  España 4	  Ireland	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	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Finally,	  the	  collapse	  of	  home	  prices	  had	  severe	  effects	  on	  the	  financial	  sector.	  	  After	  home	  prices	  in	  the	  U.S.	  began	  to	  decline,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  investment	  banks	  were	  extremely	  leveraged	  in	  the	  market	  for	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities.	  	  Most	  economists	  cite	  the	  housing	  bubble	  in	  the	  U.S.	  as	  the	  direct	  catalyst	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis.	  	  Additionally,	  housing	  bubbles	  in	  Spain	  and	  Ireland	  were	  two	  causes	  of	  the	  debt	  crisis	  in	  the	  Eurozone.	  	  The	  IMF	  estimated	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  the	  crisis	  to	  central	  banks	  at	  	  $10.9	  trillion,	  which	  includes	  support	  in	  the	  form	  of	  liquidity,	  buying	  toxic	  assets,	  and	  guaranteeing	  future	  debt	  and	  liquidity	  support.	  	  
1c	  The	  Debate	  over	  Monetary	  Policy	  	  In	  a	  2009	  working	  paper	  entitled	  “The	  Financial	  Crisis	  and	  the	  Policy	  Responses:	  An	  Empirical	  Analysis	  of	  What	  Went	  Wrong,”	  John	  Taylor	  concludes	  that	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  bubble	  was	  caused	  by	  monetary	  policy,	  specifically	  setting	  the	  interest	  rates	  too	  low.	  	  The	  Taylor	  Rule	  is	  a	  policy	  rule	  of	  thumb	  that	  Taylor	  introduced	  in	  1993.	  	  (See	  explanation	  below)	  According	  to	  the	  Taylor	  Rule,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  should	  target	  the	  real	  interest	  rate	  by	  using	  the	  deviation	  of	  actual	  inflation	  from	  its	  target	  and	  the	  deviation	  of	  the	  “output	  gap.”	  	  	  Evaluating	  the	  Tightness	  or	  Ease	  of	  Monetary	  Policy:	  	  General	  Form	  of	  the	  Taylor	  rule:	  	   	  	  where:	  
• 	  is	  the	  prescribed	  value	  of	  the	  policy	  interest	  rate	  in	  a	  given	  period	  t.	  
• πt	  	  -­‐	  π*	  is	  the	  deviation	  of	  the	  actual	  inflation	  rate	  πt	  from	  its	  target	  π*	  in	  period	  t;	  and	  
• a	  and	  b	  are	  positive	  numbers	  
• 	  r*	  is	  the	  assumed	  equilibrium	  real	  interest	  rate	  	  
• yt	  and	  yt*	  are	  the	  logs	  of	  actual/potential	  GDP	  	  
Figure	  1.5	  
(Source	  Federal	  Reserve)	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The	  Taylor	  rule	  is	  forward	  looking;	  however,	  Taylor’s	  paper	  (2009)	  applies	  this	  rule	  to	  the	  past	  decisions	  of	  central	  banks	  around	  the	  world.	  	  According	  to	  this	  analysis,	  housing	  booms	  were	  the	  largest	  in	  countries	  where	  monetary	  policy	  deviates	  furthest	  from	  the	  Taylor	  rule.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  provides	  a	  uniform	  monetary	  policy,	  Taylor	  applied	  his	  rule	  to	  each	  individual	  country	  in	  the	  euro-­‐zone	  and	  used	  different	  measures	  of	  output	  and	  inflation.	  	  For	  example,	  Taylor	  found	  that	  the	  nation	  with	  the	  largest	  deviation	  from	  the	  rule	  was	  Spain,	  which	  had	  the	  largest	  housing	  boom.	  	   Ben	  Bernanke	  strongly	  argues	  against	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  and	  concludes	  that	  monetary	  policy	  was	  not	  responsible	  for	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  bubble.	  	  In	  his	  2010	  speech	  entitled	  “Monetary	  Policy	  and	  the	  Housing	  Bubble,”	  he	  states	  “the	  magnitude	  of	  house	  price	  gains	  seems	  too	  large	  to	  be	  readily	  explainable	  by	  the	  stance	  of	  monetary	  policy	  alone.”	  	  He	  also	  points	  out	  that	  monetary	  policy	  is	  forward	  looking;	  therefore,	  it	  is	  much	  easier	  to	  point	  out	  better	  policies	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  past.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  was	  concerned	  about	  deflation	  in	  2003	  after	  the	  recession.	  	  Without	  being	  able	  to	  accurately	  predict	  the	  future,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  must	  apply	  whichever	  policies	  they	  think	  are	  most	  important,	  and	  so	  they	  applied	  policies	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  deflation.	  Bernanke	  also	  used	  the	  residuals	  from	  the	  Taylor	  rule	  to	  study	  the	  relationship	  between	  monetary	  policy	  and	  house	  prices,	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  relationship	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  	  (Seen	  in	  Figure	  1.6)	  	  Additionally,	  Bernanke	  points	  out	  an	  error	  with	  this	  model;	  it	  could	  potentially	  overstate	  the	  causal	  relationship	  within	  the	  Eurozone,	  because	  this	  analysis	  assumes	  that	  the	  Eurozone	  countries	  had	  control	  over	  their	  own	  monetary	  policy.	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Figure	  1.6:	  Regression	  of	  change	  in	  house	  prices	  and	  Taylor	  Rule	  Residuals	  
Source:	  Ben	  Bernanke	  (2010)	  	  	   According	  to	  Bernanke,	  the	  large	  current	  account	  deficits	  in	  developing	  countries	  are	  a	  better	  explanation	  for	  housing	  booms.	  	  Bernanke	  proposed	  his	  “Global	  Savings	  Glut”	  hypothesis	  in	  2005,	  where	  he	  explained	  the	  situation	  of	  global	  imbalances.	  	  In	  his	  2010	  speech,	  he	  argues	  that	  current	  account	  deficits	  in	  developed	  countries	  and	  surpluses	  in	  developing	  countries	  have	  a	  stronger	  relationship	  with	  changes	  in	  home	  prices.	  	  (Shown	  in	  Figure	  1.7)	  	  Bernanke	  ran	  a	  regression	  of	  current	  account	  levels	  and	  changes	  in	  real	  house	  prices,	  and	  he	  found	  that	  this	  relationship	  was	  more	  statistically	  significant	  than	  monetary	  policy.	  	  According	  to	  Bernanke	  “about	  31%	  of	  the	  variability	  in	  house	  price	  appreciation	  across	  countries	  is	  explained.”	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Figure	  1.7	  
Source:	  Ben	  Bernanke	  (2010)	  	  
1d	  Hyman	  Minsky’s	  Financial	  Instability	  Hypothesis	  This	  paper	  will	  examine	  these	  hypotheses,	  and	  Hyman	  P.	  Minsky’s	  (1919-­‐1996)	  Financial	  Instability	  Hypothesis	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  “Irrational	  Exuberance.”	  	  His	  hypothesis	  states	  that	  in	  periods	  of	  good	  times,	  money	  managers	  tend	  to	  overestimate	  returns	  and	  underestimate	  risk.	  	  This	  long	  period	  of	  prosperity	  essentially	  destabilizes	  the	  Financial	  System	  because	  investors	  lose	  their	  memories	  of	  tough	  times,	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  credit	  becomes	  more	  rampant.	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2	  Understanding	  Booms	  and	  Bubbles	  in	  Home	  Prices	  	  
	   After	  the	  rapid	  deterioration	  of	  home	  prices	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  Spain,	  and	  Ireland,	  it	  was	  very	  clear	  that	  these	  countries	  experienced	  bubbles	  in	  their	  housing	  markets.	  	  Other	  countries,	  such	  as	  Sweden	  and	  Australia	  experienced	  a	  boom	  in	  their	  home	  prices,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  unclear	  if	  these	  markets	  are	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  housing	  bubble.	  Fundamental	  factors	  such	  as	  population	  growth	  and	  increased	  competition	  in	  mortgage	  markets	  can	  increase	  the	  price	  of	  homes.	  	  This	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  irrational	  causes	  of	  recent	  activity	  in	  housing	  markets,	  such	  as	  speculation	  and	  looser	  credit	  conditions.	  	  
2a	  Speculation	  An	  asset	  price	  bubble	  is	  an	  unsustainable	  rise	  in	  prices	  due	  to	  speculation.	  	  Bubbles	  usually	  begin	  with	  an	  exogenous	  shock,	  such	  as	  financial	  innovation,	  and	  are	  fueled	  by	  speculation	  and	  credit	  expansion.	  	  Sometimes	  investors	  believe	  that	  “this	  time	  is	  different”	  and	  there	  are	  certain	  fundamental	  factors,	  which	  have	  caused	  the	  asset	  price	  to	  skyrocket.	  In	  the	  late	  1990s,	  Alan	  Greenspan	  justified	  the	  stock	  market	  bubble	  by	  the	  development	  of	  information	  technology	  and	  his	  belief	  in	  the	  “New	  American	  Economy.”	  	  The	  dot-­‐com	  bubble	  began	  because	  investors	  saw	  productivity	  and	  corporate	  profits	  rise	  at	  an	  unprecedented	  level.	  However,	  speculation	  drove	  the	  prices	  too	  high	  and	  the	  dot-­‐com	  bubble	  led	  to	  unsustainable	  price	  levels.	  There	  are	  several	  exogenous	  shocks	  that	  might	  have	  driven	  up	  home	  prices	  in	  the	  period	  of	  2000-­‐2007.	  	  The	  entry	  into	  the	  Eurozone	  was	  a	  powerful	  shock	  to	  the	  financial	  systems	  in	  many	  European	  countries	  and	  increased	  optimism	  that	  Eurozone	  GDP	  would	  expand	  with	  increased	  European	  trade.	  	  	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  some	  economists	  believe	  that	  the	  dot-­‐com	  bubble	  was	  the	  catalyst	  for	  the	  subsequent	  housing	  bubble.	  	  After	  the	  dot-­‐com	  bubble,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  kept	  interest	  rates	  low	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  a	  deep	  recession,	  which	  led	  to	  an	  initial	  rise	  in	  home	  prices.	  	  Also,	  after	  the	  dot.com	  bubble,	  consumers	  believed	  that	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homes	  were	  a	  much	  more	  stable	  investment	  than	  the	  stock	  market.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  responses	  to	  the	  dot-­‐com	  bubble	  led	  to	  an	  initial	  rise	  in	  home	  prices,	  which	  took	  off	  from	  2000-­‐2007.	  “It	  could	  be	  that	  the	  home	  price	  boom,	  which	  began	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  countries	  before	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  market,	  started	  in	  1998	  in	  response	  to	  the	  stock	  market	  boom	  and	  just	  fed	  on	  itself	  through	  its	  own	  internal	  feedback	  after	  the	  stock	  market	  fizzled.”5	  	  	  The	  initial	  rise	  in	  prices	  from	  an	  exogenous	  shock	  leads	  to	  a	  bubble	  when	  investors	  start	  to	  speculate	  on	  future	  capital	  gains.	  	  	  According	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  adaptive	  expectations,	  investors	  use	  the	  assumption	  that	  past	  price	  movements	  will	  continue	  in	  the	  future.	  	  This	  assumption	  is	  fueled	  by	  several	  positive	  feedback	  loops.	  	  First,	  initial	  price	  movements	  lead	  to	  “herd	  behavior.”	  	  After	  certain	  investors	  get	  rich,	  everyone	  wants	  the	  same	  returns.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  high	  demand	  for	  a	  certain	  asset	  and	  even	  higher	  prices.	  	  Second,	  as	  asset	  prices	  climb,	  consumer	  spending	  and	  national	  income	  rise,	  which	  leads	  to	  a	  false	  sense	  of	  optimism.	  Research	  has	  shown	  that	  when	  markets	  are	  overvalued,	  individuals	  are	  more	  optimistic	  about	  market	  conditions.	  	  
2b	  Financial	  Innovation	  	  
	   Policy	  makers	  and	  economists	  often	  cite	  financial	  innovation	  in	  mortgage	  markets	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  U.S.	  subprime	  mortgage	  crisis	  and	  housing	  bubble.	  	  According	  to	  a	  paper	  by	  Diamond	  and	  Rajan	  (2009),	  the	  securitization	  of	  mortgages	  misallocated	  too	  much	  capital	  to	  the	  housing	  sector.	  	  They	  note	  that	  the	  crisis	  was	  caused	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  excess	  capital	  from	  developing	  countries	  and	  easy	  monetary	  policy.	  They	  also	  stated	  that	  the	  crisis	  first	  manifested	  in	  the	  U.S.	  because	  the	  U.S.	  had	  the	  most	  advanced	  securitization	  of	  mortgages,	  and	  created	  more	  sub-­‐prime	  loans.	  	  	  In	  2007,	  the	  IMF	  released	  a	  report	  entitled	  “Housing	  and	  the	  Business	  Cycle.”	  They	  studied	  the	  differences	  between	  mortgage	  markets	  in	  the	  period	  before	  1980,	  when	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Shiller	  79	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regulations	  were	  much	  tighter,	  and	  mortgage	  markets	  after	  1980.	  	  Although	  regulation	  varied	  between	  countries,	  securitization	  and	  deregulation	  led	  to	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  banks	  and	  financial	  institutions	  involved	  in	  mortgage	  markets	  after	  1980.	  According	  to	  the	  IMF,	  deregulation	  was	  rapid	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Canada,	  Australia,	  and	  the	  Nordic	  countries.	  	  However,	  some	  countries,	  such	  as	  Japan,	  Germany,	  France,	  and	  Italy	  experienced	  a	  slower	  shift	  in	  mortgage	  market	  development.	  	  With	  increased	  competition	  amongst	  mortgage	  lenders	  and	  new	  financial	  products,	  more	  borrowers	  were	  able	  to	  secure	  mortgage	  loans.	  Since	  financial	  regulation	  and	  innovation	  changed	  in	  the	  1980s,	  it	  cannot	  fully	  explain	  why	  global	  home	  prices	  skyrocketed	  from	  2000	  to	  2007.	  	  However,	  changes	  in	  the	  mortgage	  market	  structure	  could	  have	  helped	  fuel	  a	  housing	  bubble.	  	  For	  example,	  option	  adjustable	  rate	  mortgages	  were	  developed	  in	  the	  1990s	  but	  they	  became	  much	  more	  common	  during	  the	  housing	  expansion.	  	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  15%	  of	  mortgages	  written	  in	  2006	  in	  the	  U.S.	  were	  option	  adjustable	  rate	  mortgages	  in	  comparison	  to	  only	  1%	  of	  mortgages	  in	  2001.	  	  
2c	  Credit	  Conditions	  and	  Minsky’s	  Hypothesis	  “The	  impact	  of	  easy	  monetary	  conditions	  on	  the	  housing	  cycle	  presumably	  was	  magnified	  by	  the	  loosening	  of	  lending	  standards	  and	  excessive	  risk-­‐taking	  by	  lenders.”6	  	  
	   According	  to	  Bernanke,	  monetary	  policy	  cannot	  completely	  explain	  the	  recent	  bubble	  in	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  market.	  	  However,	  Bernanke	  did	  not	  consider	  risk	  appetite	  and	  loosening	  of	  credit	  standards	  due	  to	  a	  long	  period	  of	  low	  rates.	  	  According	  to	  the	  IMF’s	  report,	  deregulation	  in	  the	  mortgage	  market	  over	  the	  past	  30	  years	  impacted	  the	  monetary	  policy	  transmission	  to	  home	  prices.	  	  Before	  1980,	  when	  traditional	  mortgage	  lenders	  dominated	  mortgage	  markets,	  monetary	  policy	  had	  a	  very	  quick	  and	  direct	  impact	  on	  home	  prices.	  	  During	  the	  years	  after	  1980	  changes	  in	  monetary	  policy	  had	  a	  smaller	  effect	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  "Housing	  and	  the	  Business	  Cycle."	  World	  Economic	  Outlook,	  IMF	  (Apr.	  2008).	  	  
	   McKenna	  14	  	  	  
home	  prices,	  but	  these	  effects	  lasted	  for	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time.	  	  These	  differences	  might	  be	  attributed	  to	  secondary	  mortgage	  markets.	  	  Instead	  of	  one	  local	  lender	  holding	  on	  to	  mortgages	  for	  a	  long	  period	  of	  times,	  these	  local	  banks	  sold	  their	  mortgage	  holdings	  to	  secondary	  markets,	  packaged	  as	  mortgage	  backed	  securities.	  	  Since	  this	  secondary	  market	  was	  distanced	  from	  the	  original	  borrower,	  some	  investors	  underestimated	  the	  riskiness	  of	  these	  new	  products.	  	  This	  new	  development	  allowed	  for	  more	  competition	  in	  the	  mortgage	  market	  but	  it	  also	  led	  to	  a	  higher	  risk	  appetite	  of	  banks.	  Minsky	  was	  known	  as	  an	  economic	  expert	  on	  credit	  crunches,	  and	  he	  examined	  certain	  features	  of	  financial	  crises	  including	  speculation,	  euphoria,	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  credit.	  	  He	  noted	  that	  the	  supply	  of	  credit	  was	  cyclical;	  in	  good	  times	  credit	  was	  easily	  available.	  	  After	  a	  bubble,	  banks	  panic	  and	  the	  supply	  of	  credit	  tightens,	  which	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “Minsky	  moment.”	  He	  believed	  the	  cyclical	  behavior	  of	  the	  credit	  supply	  destabilizes	  the	  financial	  system.	  According	  to	  the	  second	  theorem	  of	  his	  Financial	  Instability	  Hypothesis,	  “Over	  periods	  of	  prolonged	  prosperity,	  the	  economy	  transits	  from	  financial	  relations	  that	  make	  for	  a	  stable	  system	  to	  financial	  relations	  that	  make	  for	  an	  unstable	  system.”7	  	  In	  summary,	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  prosperity	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  credit	  expansion	  and	  financial	  instability.	  Many	  papers	  argue	  that	  keeping	  interest	  rates	  low	  for	  a	  very	  long	  period	  of	  time	  can	  impact	  bank’s	  optimism	  and	  lower	  credit	  standards.	  Harvard	  professor	  Chris	  Foote	  points	  out	  that	  mortgage	  loans	  are	  secured	  assets,	  which	  means	  if	  a	  homeowner	  defaults	  on	  their	  mortgage,	  the	  bank	  can	  seize	  their	  asset.	  As	  home	  prices	  continue	  to	  rise,	  the	  cost	  of	  default	  becomes	  smaller	  and	  mortgage	  loans	  are	  less	  risky.	  	  This	  feedback	  loop	  could	  influence	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Minsky,	  Hyman	  P.	  "The	  Financial	  Instability	  Hypothesis."	  Jerome	  Levy	  Economics	  Institute	  of	  Bard	  College	  (1992).	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availability	  of	  mortgage	  loans,	  which	  would	  further	  increase	  home	  prices.	  If	  banks	  see	  a	  long	  period	  of	  monetary	  expansion,	  they	  might	  base	  their	  decisions	  on	  this	  trend.	  	  As	  GDP	  continues	  to	  rise	  at	  a	  constant	  rate,	  investors	  will	  expect	  the	  central	  bank	  to	  maintain	  the	  same	  policies.	  	  According	  to	  Federal	  Reserve	  Governor	  Jeremy	  Stein,	  “	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  low	  interest	  rates,	  of	  the	  sort	  we	  are	  experiencing	  today,	  can	  create	  incentives	  or	  agents	  to	  take	  on	  greater	  duration	  or	  credit	  risks,	  or	  to	  employ	  additional	  financial	  leverage,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  ‘reach	  for	  yield.’”8	  In	  the	  paper	  Hazardous	  times	  for	  Monetary	  Policy,	  a	  working	  paper	  from	  the	  Banco	  de	  España	  (2008),	  Jiménez	  et	  al.	  studied	  the	  effects	  of	  monetary	  policy	  on	  credit	  availability.	  	  Their	  data	  set,	  from	  the	  Credit	  Register	  of	  the	  Banco	  de	  Espana,	  included	  23	  million	  bank	  loans.	  	  This	  study	  is	  ideal	  for	  understanding	  the	  effects	  of	  monetary	  policy	  on	  credit	  standards,	  because	  interest	  rates	  in	  Spain	  have	  been	  “set	  by	  Frankfurt”	  since	  the	  late	  1980s,	  when	  Spain	  adopted	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  system	  to	  the	  Deutsche	  mark.	  According	  to	  their	  study,	  they	  found	  robust	  evidence	  that	  during	  a	  long	  period	  of	  lower	  short-­‐term	  rates,	  banks	  and	  financial	  institutions	  in	  Spain	  lowered	  standards	  for	  the	  credit	  history	  of	  current	  and	  potential	  borrowers.	  Low	  interest	  rates	  also	  spur	  economic	  activity	  and	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  higher	  growth	  rate	  of	  GDP.	  This	  causes	  the	  net	  worth	  of	  borrowers	  to	  rise,	  which	  allows	  banks	  to	  take	  on	  more	  subprime	  borrowers.	  	  The	  study	  by	  Jiménez	  et	  al.	  found	  that	  GDP	  growth	  reduces	  credit	  risk	  for	  new	  and	  outstanding	  loans.	  	  These	  results	  are	  specific	  to	  Spain’s	  financial	  system;	  however,	  further	  studies	  might	  find	  that	  these	  effects	  are	  similar	  across	  countries.	  	  According	  to	  a	  study	  by	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  (2010),	  the	  level	  of	  GDP	  growth	  across	  countries	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  led	  to	  a	  softening	  of	  credit	  standards.	  	  They	  also	  found	  that	  low	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Stein,	  Jeremy	  C.	  "Overheating	  in	  Credit	  Markets:	  Origins,	  Measurement,	  and	  Policy	  Responses."	  Proc.	  of	  "Restoring	  Household	  Financial	  Stability	  after	  the	  Great	  Recession:	  Why	  Household	  Balance	  Sheets	  Matter",	  St.	  Louis,	  Missouri.	  2013.	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short-­‐term	  rates	  have	  a	  stronger	  impact	  on	  bank’s	  risk	  appetite	  than	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates.	  	  Finally,	  they	  determined	  that	  weak	  bank	  supervision	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  securitization	  amplified	  the	  effects	  of	  interest	  rates.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  compare	  the	  mild	  recession	  after	  the	  dot.com	  bubble	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  	  There	  are	  several	  factors,	  which	  differed	  between	  the	  two	  bubbles.	  First,	  investors	  were	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  bubble	  in	  the	  stock	  market.	  	  According	  to	  a	  survey	  in	  April	  1999,	  72%	  of	  professional	  money	  managers	  believed	  that	  the	  stock	  market	  was	  in	  a	  bubble.	  	  In	  a	  2004	  survey	  of	  U.S.	  homeowners	  only	  1%	  used	  the	  term	  “bubble”	  to	  describe	  the	  housing	  market.	  	  Bordo	  and	  Jeanne	  (2002)	  studied	  the	  same	  OECD	  countries	  as	  this	  study	  from	  the	  period	  1970-­‐2002.	  	  According	  to	  their	  historical	  data,	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  boom	  in	  property	  prices	  ending	  in	  a	  bust	  was	  52%,	  whereas	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  boom	  in	  stock	  prices	  ending	  in	  a	  bust	  was	  around	  12%.	  	  This	  shows	  that	  irrational	  exuberance	  is	  even	  stronger	  in	  housing	  markets.	  Minsky	  believed	  that	  investor	  optimism	  plays	  an	  important	  part	  in	  volatility	  of	  the	  financial	  system.	  	  After	  a	  recession,	  investors	  are	  more	  prudent	  with	  their	  money.	  	  As	  time	  goes	  one,	  investors	  lose	  their	  “memory”	  of	  tough	  times.	  	  If	  the	  economy	  keeps	  growing	  for	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time,	  money	  managers	  tend	  to	  overvalue	  new	  financial	  products	  and	  undervalue	  their	  risks.	  	  There	  have	  been	  many	  instances	  of	  euphoria	  affecting	  the	  judgment	  of	  banks	  and	  economists.	  	  Irving	  Fisher	  famously	  said	  shortly	  before	  the	  crash	  of	  1929	  "Stock	  prices	  have	  reached	  what	  looks	  like	  a	  permanently	  high	  plateau."	  In	  September	  2006	  a	  poll	  of	  69	  economists	  stated	  that	  there	  was	  only	  a	  25%	  chance	  of	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  falling	  into	  a	  recession	  in	  2007.	  	  	  According	  to	  Goldman	  Sachs	  Economist	  Bill	  Dudley	  in	  January	  2006,	  the	  yield	  curve	  was	  not	  signaling	  a	  recession.	  	  Instead,	  Dudley	  believed	  that	  the	  flattening	  of	  the	  yield	  curve	  was	  a	  signal	  of	  investors’	  confidence	  in	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  to	  reduce	  volatility	  in	  core	  inflation.	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Finally,	  Minsky	  believed	  that	  excessive	  debt	  was	  the	  cause	  of	  financial	  crises.	  He	  developed	  a	  theory,	  which	  described	  three	  levels	  of	  debt	  financing:	  hedge	  finance,	  speculative	  finance,	  and	  Ponzi	  finance:	  “A	  firm	  is	  in	  the	  hedge	  finance	  group	  if	  its	  anticipated	  operating	  income	  is	  more	  than	  sufficient	  to	  pay	  both	  the	  interest	  and	  scheduled	  reduction	  in	  its	  indebtedness.	  	  A	  firm	  is	  in	  the	  speculative	  finance	  group	  if	  its	  anticipated	  operating	  income	  is	  sufficient	  so	  it	  can	  pay	  the	  interest	  on	  its	  indebtedness;	  however	  the	  firm	  must	  use	  cash	  from	  new	  loans	  to	  repay	  part	  or	  all	  of	  the	  amounts	  due	  on	  maturing	  loans.	  	  A	  firm	  is	  in	  the	  Ponzi	  group	  if	  its	  anticipated	  operating	  income	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  large	  to	  pay	  all	  of	  the	  interest	  on	  its	  indebtedness	  on	  the	  scheduled	  due	  dates;	  to	  get	  the	  cash	  the	  firm	  must	  either	  increase	  its	  indebtedness	  or	  sell	  some	  assets.	  Minsky’s	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  when	  the	  economy	  slows,	  some	  of	  the	  firms	  that	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  hedge	  finance	  are	  shunted	  to	  the	  group	  involved	  in	  speculative	  finance	  and	  that	  some	  of	  the	  firms	  that	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  the	  speculative	  finance	  group	  now	  find	  that	  they	  are	  in	  the	  Ponzi	  finance	  group.”9	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  bubbles	  lead	  to	  financial	  crises	  if	  investors	  and	  firms	  are	  heavily	  indebted.	  	  Once	  the	  price	  of	  the	  asset	  starts	  to	  decline,	  certain	  firms	  fail	  and	  panic	  begins.	  A	  “Minsky	  moment”	  can	  turn	  into	  a	  crisis	  if	  investors	  are	  heavily	  indebted.	  	  In	  2005	  U.S.	  private	  debt	  was	  15%	  higher	  than	  in	  1999,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  figure	  below.	  This	  statistic	  might	  signal	  that	  firms	  and	  households	  used	  more	  debt	  to	  invest	  in	  real	  estate	  during	  the	  housing	  bubble	  than	  stocks	  during	  the	  dot.com	  bubble.	  	  Afterwards,	  the	  financial	  system	  went	  into	  panic,	  as	  Minsky	  predicted.	  	  In	  the	  Eurozone,	  low	  short-­‐term	  rates	  drove	  up	  debt	  in	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  countries	  like	  Ireland	  and	  Spain.	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Figure	  2.1	  
Source	  :	  The	  Economist	  	   Although	  Minsky’s	  beliefs	  are	  very	  applicable	  to	  the	  recent	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  the	  tools	  used	  by	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  generally	  ignore	  the	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  financial	  sector.	  	  Financial	  crises	  can	  have	  major	  effects	  on	  output	  and	  inflation,	  which	  are	  typically	  mandates	  of	  central	  banks.	  	  Therefore,	  some	  economists	  argue	  that	  central	  bankers	  should	  change	  their	  responses	  to	  asset	  price	  booms	  and	  bubbles	  in	  order	  to	  stabilize	  output.	  
	  
3	  Empirical	  Analysis	  
3a	  Fixed	  Effect	  Model	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  recent	  activity	  in	  housing	  markets,	  a	  fixed	  effects	  panel	  regression	  will	  be	  used	  over	  the	  years	  2001-­‐2011.	  	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  percentage	  change	  of	  real	  home	  prices	  year	  over	  year.	  	  The	  panel	  regression	  will	  attempt	  to	  determine	  the	  magnitude	  and	  significance	  of	  several	  independent	  variables.	  	  In	  order	  to	  pick	  up	  external	  variables,	  which	  differ	  across	  countries,	  the	  fixed	  effects	  model	  includes	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  each	  country.	  	  Therefore	  the	  model	  follows	  the	  form:	  
U.S.	  Private	  Sector	  Debt	  (as	  %	  of	  GDP)	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  where	  i	  represents	  each	  country	  and	  j	  represents	  each	  year.	  	  	  
3b	  Independent	  Variables	  	  The	  percentage	  change	  of	  home	  prices	  is	  measured	  in	  real	  terms;	  therefore,	  it	  was	  important	  to	  include	  real	  interest	  rates.	  	  	  Usually	  real	  interest	  rates	  are	  measured	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  interest	  rates	  and	  expected	  inflation.	  	  Since	  data	  on	  historical	  inflation	  is	  available,	  I	  assumed	  that	  the	  actual	  inflation	  rate	  was	  close	  enough	  to	  the	  expected	  inflation.	  	  This	  also	  helped	  control	  for	  differences	  in	  interest	  rates	  among	  Eurozone	  countries,	  by	  subtracting	  different	  inflation	  rates	  from	  each	  country.	  Long-­‐term	  rates	  and	  short-­‐term	  rates	  are	  highly	  correlated;	  therefore,	  I	  decided	  to	  use	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  long-­term	  
rate	  and	  the	  short-­term	  rate	  as	  an	  independent	  variable.	  	  This	  spread	  variable	  is	  used	  in	  other	  working	  papers,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  good	  variable	  to	  measure	  the	  effect	  of	  monetary	  policy.	  	  Long-­‐term	  rates	  and	  short-­‐term	  rates	  are	  correlated	  but	  they	  do	  not	  always	  move	  exactly	  together.	  	  If	  investors	  believe	  that	  the	  Central	  Bank	  set	  the	  interbank	  rate	  too	  low,	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  increase	  in	  response.	  	  Therefore	  this	  variable	  is	  a	  good	  measure	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  monetary	  policy	  on	  investor’s	  decisions.	  	  Additionally,	  I	  used	  bank’s	  capital	  to	  assets	  ratio	  to	  study	  their	  risk	  appetite.	  	  If	  banks	  had	  a	  very	  low	  capital	  to	  asset	  ratio,	  they	  would	  be	  taking	  more	  risk.	  	  In	  order	  to	  test	  Minsky’s	  hypothesis,	  a	  koyck-­distributed	  lag	  will	  be	  used	  to	  demonstrate	  expected	  GDP	  growth	  and	  expected	  variance,	  placing	  a	  larger	  weight	  on	  recent	  experience.	  During	  periods	  of	  economic	  optimism,	  investors	  expect	  higher	  rates	  of	  returns	  with	  less	  risk,	  based	  on	  past	  experience.	  	  This	  causes	  investors	  to	  bid	  up	  asset	  prices	  and	  take	  on	  more	  debt.	  	  In	  order	  to	  construct	  each	  Koyck	  distributed	  lag,	  assume	  that	  the	  expected	  value	  of	  g	  (growth	  rate	  of	  real	  GDP)	  for	  t+1	  is	  a	  weighted	  average	  of	  past	  growth	  rates	  with	  relatively	  more	  weight	  on	  the	  recent	  past.	  	  Using	  Koyck	  weights,	  this	  takes	  the	  form	  of:	  
€ 
Yij = β1Xij +α i + ui
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  If	  this	  is	  an	  infinite	  series,	  with	  w	  <1,	  then	  the	  expression	  for	  gt*	  collapses	  to	  	  
	  Since	  the	  data	  set	  is	  not	  infinite,	  we	  approximate	  this	  by	  going	  back	  1960,	  which	  is	  the	  initial	  year	  N,	  and	  we	  set	  gN*	  at	  what	  we	  see	  as	  a	  reasonable	  initial	  value,	  g0.	  	  Thus	  
€ 
Egt+1 = gt* = wgt +(1− w)gt−1 	  
for	  t>N	  
€ 
Eg+1 = gt* = g0 	  
For	  t=N	  	  	  In	  like	  manner,	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  perceived	  stability	  of	  growth	  rates,	  assume	  that	  the	  perceived	  variance	  of	  the	  growth	  rate	  for	  next	  year	  is	  a	  weighted	  average	  of	  squared	  deviations	  of	  actual	  g	  from	  expected	  g	  over	  the	  past,	  with	  more	  weight	  on	  the	  recent	  past.	  Let	  us	  call	  this	  measure	  V	  (for	  perceived,	  or	  subjective	  variance).	  	  	  
€ 
Vt+1 = w(gt − Egt )2 + (1− w)Vt−1 	  for	  t	  >N	  
€ 
Vt+1 =V0 	  	  for	  t=N	  
	   Under	  Minsky’s	  model,	  we	  would	  expect	  asset	  prices	  to	  rise	  with	  higher	  expected	  growth	  and	  to	  rise	  with	  lower	  variability	  of	  growth.10	  In	  order	  to	  standardize	  this	  variable,	  I	  used	  the	  square	  root	  of	  the	  perceived	  variances.	  	  The	  constructed	  lag	  for	  GDP	  and	  the	  deviations	  from	  expectations	  will	  be	  used	  as	  independent	  variables	  in	  the	  panel	  regression.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Petersen,	  Harold	  “Notes	  on	  using	  Koyck	  weights	  to	  estimate	  the	  mean	  and	  variance	  of	  growth	  over	  the	  next	  year.”	  7	  Dec.	  2012.	  
€ 
Egt+1 = gt* = wgt + w(1− w)gt−1 + w(1− w)2gt−2 + ...
= w (1− w
i=0
n
∑ )i gt− i
€ 
Egt+1 = gt* = wgt + (1− w)gt−1 *
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I	  used	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  OECD	  as	  my	  data	  sources,	  because	  their	  data	  is	  internationally	  comparable.	  	  I	  had	  hoped	  to	  include	  a	  variable	  on	  the	  level	  of	  mortgage	  debt	  in	  each	  country;	  however,	  this	  data	  was	  not	  available.	  
Figure	  3.1:	  Variables	  	  Variable	  Name	   Explanation	   Source	  
pch	   Percentage	  Change	  of	  Real	  House	  Prices	  over	  Previous	  Periods	   OECD	  
dif	   Difference	  between	  Long-­‐term	  Real	  Interest	  Rate	  and	  Short-­‐term	  Real	  Interest	  Rate	   OECD	  
stirreal	   Short-­‐Term	  Real	  Interest	  rate	   OECD	  
asset	   Bank	  capital	  to	  assets	  ratio	  (%)	   World	  Bank	  
gdp	   Koyck-­‐distributed	  lag	  of	  GDP	  growth	  (%)	  since	  1960	   World	  Bank	  
sd	   Standard	  Deviation	  of	  GDP	  expectations	  developed	  from	  Lag	   World	  Bank	  
	  
3c	  Results	  	   I	  decided	  to	  add	  a	  one-­‐year	  lag	  to	  short-­‐term	  rates	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  interest	  rates.	  	  This	  tests	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  monetary	  policy	  affected	  home	  prices.	  Below	  are	  results	  from	  a	  panel	  regression	  in	  Stata.	  	  R-­‐sq=.4921	  Variable	   Coefficient	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	   P>|t|	  diflag	   3.018154	   .4971098	   6.07	   0.000	  stirreallag	   -­‐1.05416	   	  .3904937	   -­‐2.70	   0.008	  asset	   .4406892	   .4321608	   1.02	   0.310	  gdp	  (20%	  weight)	   4.357739	   .7321723	   5.95	   0.000	  sd	  (20%	  weight)	   .194250	   .9691596	   0.20	   0.841	  	  	   As	  seen	  above,	  the	  variables	  measuring	  monetary	  policy	  were	  highly	  significant.	  	  The	  short-­‐term	  real	  rate	  has	  an	  inverse	  relationship	  with	  home	  prices	  and	  a	  larger	  difference	  between	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  and	  short-­‐term	  rates	  has	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  home	  prices.	  	  Therefore,	  these	  estimators	  are	  consistent	  with	  Taylor’s	  Hypothesis	  that	  countries	  with	  rates	  that	  were	  too	  low	  experienced	  booms	  in	  their	  housing	  sector.	  All	  other	  things	  equal,	  a	  -­‐1.054	  reduction	  in	  real	  short	  rates	  leads	  to	  a	  1%	  rise	  in	  national	  home	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prices.	  	  However,	  since	  the	  spread	  of	  rates	  and	  short-­‐term	  rates	  are	  correlated,	  this	  causal	  relationship	  is	  not	  completely	  accurate.	  	  	  GDP	  growth	  with	  20%	  weight	  on	  the	  prior	  year	  was	  also	  highly	  significant.	  	  However,	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  expected	  GDP	  was	  not	  significant.	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  why	  this	  variable	  was	  not	  significant,	  I	  ran	  regressions	  with	  different	  weights	  on	  the	  past.	  	  The	  GDP	  variable	  was	  always	  significant	  at	  different	  weights;	  however,	  the	  standard	  deviation	  weight	  remained	  not	  significant.	  	  Below	  is	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  GDP	  variable	  with	  different	  weights	  on	  the	  previous	  year.	  Weight	   Coefficient	   t-­‐value	   P>|t|	  5%	   7.431371	   4.90	   0.000	  10%	   7.611506	   6.55	   0.000	  20%	   4.357739	   5.95	   0.000	  50%	   2.044959	   5.05	   0.000	  70%	   1.650296	   5.14	   0.000	  90%	   1.355098	   4.81	   0.000	  100%	   1.236507	   4.63	   0.000	  	  This	  comparison	  shows	  a	  few	  points.	  The	  coefficient	  on	  gdp	  became	  much	  larger	  with	  a	  smaller	  weight	  on	  the	  previous	  year.	  	  This	  conclusion	  does	  not	  necessarily	  oppose	  the	  idea	  of	  irrational	  exuberance	  in	  the	  housing	  market.	  According	  to	  this	  data,	  historical	  GDP	  growth	  had	  a	  larger	  effect	  on	  home	  prices.	  	  This	  might	  be	  expected	  because	  national	  income	  typically	  increases	  the	  value	  of	  homes.	  	  However,	  GDP	  growth	  with	  70%,	  90%,	  and	  100%	  weight	  on	  the	  previous	  year	  are	  also	  highly	  significant.	  	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  investors	  bid	  up	  asset	  prices	  in	  response	  to	  GDP	  in	  the	  year	  before.	  	  
3d	  Robustness	  of	  Regression	  	   This	  table	  points	  out	  the	  correlation	  between	  independent	  variables,	  using	  20%	  weight	  on	  the	  previous	  year’s	  GDP.	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   diflag	   stirreallag	   asset	   gdp	   sd	  diflag	   1	   	   	   	   	  Stirreallag	   -­‐0.5731	   1	   	   	   	  Asset	   .0608	   -­‐0.0038	   1	   	   	  Gdp	   -­‐0.2154	   -­‐0.0038	   0.0880	   1	   	  sd	   0.3850	   -­‐0.1520	   0.0044	   -­‐0.0155	   1	  	  	   The	  high	  correlation	  between	  the	  spread	  of	  interest	  rates	  and	  the	  short-­‐term	  rates	  was	  expected.	  	  However	  the	  correlation	  between	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  GDP	  growth	  and	  the	  interest	  rate	  spread	  was	  unexpected.	  	  This	  correlation	  might	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  monetary	  policy	  responds	  to	  unexpected	  fluctuations	  in	  GDP	  growth.	  	  	  
3e	  Conclusions	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  results	  demonstrate	  that	  low	  interest	  rates	  increase	  home	  prices,	  which	  strengthens	  John	  Taylor’s	  argument.	  	  Also,	  the	  difference	  between	  long-­‐term	  and	  short-­‐term	  rates	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  home	  prices,	  showing	  that	  central	  banks	  have	  kept	  rates	  too	  low.	  	  Finally,	  the	  results	  also	  demonstrate	  that	  investors	  respond	  to	  GDP	  growth	  in	  the	  previous	  year.	  	  Since	  housing	  booms	  and	  busts	  have	  destabilizing	  effects	  on	  the	  economy,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  explore	  possible	  policy	  responses,	  which	  might	  reduce	  this	  variance.	  	  
4	  Policy	  Implications	  	  It	  is	  widely	  debated	  whether	  monetary	  policy	  should	  respond	  to	  asset	  price	  bubbles.	  Since	  booms	  and	  busts	  in	  housing	  markets	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  and	  the	  Eurozone	  debt	  crisis,	  many	  economists	  have	  re-­‐evaluated	  whether	  monetary	  policy	  can	  improve	  financial	  stability	  by	  “leaning	  against”	  bubbles.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  identify	  common	  arguments	  for	  and	  against	  using	  monetary	  policy	  in	  response	  to	  asset	  price	  bubbles.	  	  First,	  monetary	  policy	  is	  a	  very	  blunt	  tool	  to	  deal	  with	  rising	  asset	  prices.	  	  If	  central	  banks	  raise	  interest	  rates	  in	  response	  to	  a	  potential	  
	   McKenna	  24	  	  	  
bubble,	  output	  will	  drop	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  Therefore,	  regulation	  in	  financial	  markets	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  better	  tool	  because	  it	  can	  have	  a	  more	  specific	  impact	  on	  the	  bubble.	  	  Unfortunately,	  there	  are	  practical	  problems	  with	  this	  argument.	  Since	  the	  political	  process	  drives	  regulation,	  it	  can	  be	  much	  slower	  in	  reaction	  to	  problems	  in	  the	  financial	  system.	  	  Also,	  banks	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  exploit	  weaknesses	  in	  regulation.	  	  According	  to	  Federal	  Reserve	  governor	  Jeremy	  Stein,	  monetary	  policy	  can	  be	  useful	  because	  “it	  gets	  through	  all	  the	  cracks.”	  	  Second,	  central	  bankers	  worry	  that	  they	  cannot	  accurately	  identify	  an	  asset	  price	  bubble.	  	  This	  argument	  is	  not	  completely	  valid,	  because	  central	  bankers	  usually	  need	  to	  identify	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  bubble	  in	  order	  to	  predict	  future	  output	  and	  inflation.	  	  All	  of	  monetary	  policy	  is	  based	  on	  predictions,	  which	  are	  sometimes	  inaccurate.	  	  	  Finally,	  Ben	  Bernanke	  points	  out	  that	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  tried	  to	  burst	  the	  bubble	  in	  the	  late	  1920s	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  Japan	  tried	  to	  burst	  the	  bubble	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	  and	  both	  had	  disastrous	  responses.	  	  However,	  most	  economists	  who	  believe	  that	  monetary	  policy	  should	  react	  to	  asset	  prices	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  tightening	  monetary	  policy	  is	  always	  the	  best	  response.	  	  According	  to	  a	  model	  by	  Bordo	  and	  Jeanne	  (2002),	  optimal	  monetary	  policy	  should	  respond	  to	  asset	  prices	  depending	  on	  private	  sector	  optimism.	  	  When	  private	  sector	  optimism	  is	  low,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  very	  large	  probability	  of	  a	  bust.	  	  When	  private	  sector	  optimism	  is	  very	  high,	  raising	  rates	  probably	  won’t	  be	  able	  to	  control	  the	  asset	  price	  boom,	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  bust	  will	  be	  smaller.	  	  Therefore,	  raising	  rates	  when	  private	  sector	  optimism	  is	  in	  a	  medium	  range	  would	  be	  the	  best	  response.	  	  This	  best	  response	  would	  be	  a	  small	  rise	  in	  rates	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  bubble.	  This	  model	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  “leaning	  against	  the	  wind,”	  an	  idea	  which	  has	  been	  widely	  debated	  over	  the	  past	  fifteen	  years.	  	  “Leaning	  against	  the	  wind”	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  monetary	  policy	  can	  reduce	  the	  size	  of	  an	  asset	  price	  bubble	  ex	  ante	  by	  raising	  interest	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rates	  slightly	  above	  the	  Taylor	  rule.	  	  According	  to	  Alan	  Greenspan,	  monetary	  policy	  should	  only	  focus	  on	  stabilizing	  the	  economy	  after	  the	  bursting	  of	  an	  asset	  price	  bubble.	  	  Donald	  Kohn,	  former	  Vice	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  System,	  has	  revisited	  this	  debate	  following	  the	  bursting	  of	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  bubble.	  Kohn	  agreed	  with	  Greenspan	  after	  the	  bubble	  in	  1999;	  however,	  he	  wrote	  a	  paper	  in	  2008	  entitled	  “Monetary	  Policy	  and	  Asset	  Prices”	  changing	  his	  view	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  enormous	  cost	  of	  “mopping	  up”	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  bubble,	  Kohn	  now	  believes	  that	  optimal	  monetary	  policy	  would	  respond	  to	  an	  asset	  price	  bubble	  ex	  ante.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  “leaning	  against	  the	  wind,”	  if	  central	  banks	  expand	  their	  forecasting,	  bubbles	  will	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  bigger	  impact	  on	  output	  and	  growth.	  	  According	  to	  the	  IMF:	  “This	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  in	  economies	  with	  more	  developed	  mortgage	  markets,	  monetary	  policymakers	  may	  need	  to	  respond	  more	  aggressively,	  within	  a	  risk-­‐management	  approach	  that	  treats	  house	  price	  dynamics	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  factors	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  assessing	  the	  balance	  of	  risks	  to	  output	  and	  inflation.”11	  	  	  Sweden’s	  central	  bank,	  Sveriges	  Riksbank,	  has	  recently	  incorporated	  home	  prices	  into	  its	  monetary	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  	  In	  2006,	  Sveriges	  Riksbank	  decided	  to	  raise	  their	  interest	  rates	  by	  .25%	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  rising	  home	  prices.	  According	  to	  the	  Bank	  governor,	  Stefan	  Ingves,	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  research	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  monetary	  policy	  on	  home	  prices	  to	  create	  a	  formal	  rule	  of	  thumb.	  Instead,	  Sveriges	  Riksbank’s	  uses	  its	  own	  judgment	  to	  determine	  risk	  in	  the	  housing	  sector.	  Sweden’s	  home	  prices	  did	  not	  fall	  after	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  instead	  they	  kept	  rising.	  	  Despite	  the	  current	  economic	  conditions,	  Sweden’s	  central	  bank	  has	  not	  let	  interest	  rates	  drop	  too	  low	  for	  fear	  that	  the	  market	  is	  currently	  in	  a	  bubble.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  IMF	  p.	  103	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Unfortunately,	  the	  Eurozone	  cannot	  use	  the	  policy	  of	  “leaning	  against	  the	  wind”	  if	  there	  are	  asset	  price	  bubbles	  in	  only	  a	  few	  member	  countries.	  	  Some	  economists	  believe	  that	  this	  dilemma	  led	  to	  the	  excessive	  public	  debt	  in	  Greece	  and	  excessive	  private	  debt	  in	  Spain	  and	  Ireland,	  which	  fueled	  their	  housing	  bubbles.	  	  After	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Eurozone,	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  in	  many	  of	  the	  member	  states	  were	  much	  lower	  than	  the	  Taylor	  rule	  would	  recommend,	  based	  on	  their	  output.	  	  Since	  rates	  are	  set	  for	  the	  entire	  region,	  they	  cannot	  respond	  to	  risks	  and	  problems	  in	  each	  member	  state.	  	  During	  the	  Eurozone	  debt	  crisis,	  this	  structural	  problem	  became	  much	  more	  important.	  	  Since	  this	  “indiscipline”	  is	  difficult	  to	  constrain,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  Eurozone	  will	  constantly	  experience	  debt	  crises	  and	  imbalances	  in	  the	  peripheral	  countries.	  Bernard	  Connolly,	  an	  economist	  who	  initially	  predicted	  the	  Eurozone	  debt	  crisis,	  provides	  a	  very	  grim	  view	  of	  the	  currency	  union.	  According	  to	  Connolly	  “Either	  Germany	  pays	  something	  like	  10%	  of	  German	  GDP	  a	  year,	  every	  year,	  forever”	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  funding	  the	  bailouts	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Eurozone	  or	  finally	  Germany	  might	  decide	  to	  drop	  the	  currency.	  	  He	  believes	  that	  the	  euro	  countries’	  inability	  to	  control	  indiscipline	  through	  monetary	  policy	  is	  a	  structural	  problem	  that	  cannot	  be	  fixed.	  However,	  bank	  supervision	  and	  regulation	  are	  two	  other	  possibilities	  that	  Connolly	  does	  not	  consider.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  monetary	  policy,	  supervision	  and	  regulation	  must	  be	  the	  main	  tools	  for	  improving	  financial	  stability.	  	  Although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  understand	  the	  riskiness	  of	  complicated	  mortgage	  products,	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  the	  government	  to	  reduce	  leverage	  of	  banks	  and	  reduce	  household	  debt.	  For	  example,	  the	  loan	  to	  value	  ratio	  describes	  the	  value	  of	  the	  mortgage	  loan	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  property.	  	  This	  ratio	  typically	  determines	  the	  mortgage	  rate;	  however,	  governments	  could	  set	  tighter	  limits	  of	  the	  loan	  to	  value	  ratio.	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5	  Conclusion	  In	  conclusion,	  monetary	  policy	  across	  15	  countries	  had	  very	  significant	  effects	  on	  home	  prices.	  	  My	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  John	  Taylor’s	  hypothesis	  that	  countries	  with	  interest	  rates	  that	  were	  too	  low	  experienced	  booms	  and	  busts	  in	  their	  housing	  markets.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  crippling	  effects	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis,	  central	  banks	  should	  research	  the	  possibility	  of	  responding	  to	  bubbles,	  especially	  in	  the	  housing	  market.	  	  According	  to	  recent	  literature,	  periods	  of	  low	  short-­‐term	  rates	  also	  leads	  to	  increased	  credit	  availability.	  	  This	  topic	  is	  very	  applicable	  to	  the	  recent	  Eurozone	  debt	  crisis	  and	  the	  subprime	  mortgage	  crisis	  in	  the	  U.S.	  	  Easy	  credit	  conditions	  make	  it	  possible	  for	  borrowers	  to	  be	  highly	  leveraged	  and	  bid	  up	  asset	  prices.	  	  If	  monetary	  policy	  could	  respond	  to	  asset	  price	  bubbles	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  their	  development,	  they	  could	  reduce	  the	  economic	  effects	  of	  the	  bust.	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Appendix	  1	  
	  Countries	  Studied:	  1. Australia	  2. Canada	  3. Denmark	  4. Finland*	  5. France*	  6. Germany*	  7. Ireland*	  8. Italy*	  9. Japan	  10. The	  Netherlands*	  11. Norway	  12. Spain*	  13. Sweden	  14. United	  Kingdom	  15. United	  States	  *Denotes	  Eurozone	  country	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